|
@@ -203,6 +203,52 @@ be deployed such that untrusted users don't have access to any subdomains,
|
|
|
:mod:`django.contrib.sessions` also has limitations. See :ref:`the session
|
|
|
topic guide section on security <topics-session-security>` for details.
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.. _user-uploaded-content-security:
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+User-uploaded content
|
|
|
+=====================
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+.. note::
|
|
|
+ Consider :ref:`serving static files from a cloud service or CDN
|
|
|
+ <staticfiles-from-cdn>` to avoid some of these issues.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+* If your site accepts file uploads, it is strongly advised that you limit
|
|
|
+ these uploads in your Web server configuration to a reasonable
|
|
|
+ size in order to prevent denial of service (DOS) attacks. In Apache, this
|
|
|
+ can be easily set using the LimitRequestBody_ directive.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+* If you are serving your own static files, be sure that handlers like Apache's
|
|
|
+ ``mod_php``, which would execute static files as code, are disabled. You don't
|
|
|
+ want users to be able to execute arbitrary code by uploading and requesting a
|
|
|
+ specially crafted file.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+* Django's media upload handling poses some vulnerabilities when that media is
|
|
|
+ served in ways that do not follow security best practices. Specifically, an
|
|
|
+ HTML file can be uploaded as an image if that file contains a valid PNG
|
|
|
+ header followed by malicious HTML. This file will pass verification of the
|
|
|
+ libraries that Django uses for :class:`~django.db.models.ImageField` image
|
|
|
+ processing (PIL or Pillow). When this file is subsequently displayed to a
|
|
|
+ user, it may be displayed as HTML depending on the type and configuration of
|
|
|
+ your web server.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ No bulletproof technical solution exists at the framework level to safely
|
|
|
+ validate all user uploaded file content, however, there are some other steps
|
|
|
+ you can take to mitigate these attacks:
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ 1. One class of attacks can be prevented by always serving user uploaded
|
|
|
+ content from a distinct Top Level Domain (TLD). This prevents any
|
|
|
+ exploit blocked by `same-origin policy`_ protections such as cross site
|
|
|
+ scripting. For example, if your site runs on ``example.com``, you would
|
|
|
+ want to serve uploaded content (the :setting:`MEDIA_URL` setting) from
|
|
|
+ something like ``usercontent-example.com``. It's *not* sufficient to
|
|
|
+ serve content from a subdomain like ``usercontent.example.com``.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ 2. Beyond this, applications may choose to define a whitelist of allowable
|
|
|
+ file extensions for user uploaded files and configure the web server
|
|
|
+ to only serve such files.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+.. _same-origin policy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-origin_policy
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
.. _additional-security-topics:
|
|
|
|
|
|
Additional security topics
|
|
@@ -219,10 +265,6 @@ security protection of the Web server, operating system and other components.
|
|
|
* Django does not throttle requests to authenticate users. To protect against
|
|
|
brute-force attacks against the authentication system, you may consider
|
|
|
deploying a Django plugin or Web server module to throttle these requests.
|
|
|
-* If your site accepts file uploads, it is strongly advised that you limit
|
|
|
- these uploads in your Web server configuration to a reasonable
|
|
|
- size in order to prevent denial of service (DOS) attacks. In Apache, this
|
|
|
- can be easily set using the LimitRequestBody_ directive.
|
|
|
* Keep your :setting:`SECRET_KEY` a secret.
|
|
|
* It is a good idea to limit the accessibility of your caching system and
|
|
|
database using a firewall.
|