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- ===========================
- Django 2.1.11 release notes
- ===========================
- *August 1, 2019*
- Django 2.1.11 fixes security issues in 2.1.10.
- CVE-2019-14232: Denial-of-service possibility in ``django.utils.text.Truncator``
- ================================================================================
- If ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods
- were passed the ``html=True`` argument, they were extremely slow to evaluate
- certain inputs due to a catastrophic backtracking vulnerability in a regular
- expression. The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the
- :tfilter:`truncatechars_html` and :tfilter:`truncatewords_html` template
- filters, which were thus vulnerable.
- The regular expressions used by ``Truncator`` have been simplified in order to
- avoid potential backtracking issues. As a consequence, trailing punctuation may
- now at times be included in the truncated output.
- CVE-2019-14233: Denial-of-service possibility in ``strip_tags()``
- =================================================================
- Due to the behavior of the underlying ``HTMLParser``,
- :func:`django.utils.html.strip_tags` would be extremely slow to evaluate
- certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.
- The ``strip_tags()`` method is used to implement the corresponding
- :tfilter:`striptags` template filter, which was thus also vulnerable.
- ``strip_tags()`` now avoids recursive calls to ``HTMLParser`` when progress
- removing tags, but necessarily incomplete HTML entities, stops being made.
- Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of
- ``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a
- ``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with
- :func:`django.utils.html.escape`.
- CVE-2019-14234: SQL injection possibility in key and index lookups for ``JSONField``/``HStoreField``
- ====================================================================================================
- :lookup:`Key and index lookups <jsonfield.key>` for
- ``django.contrib.postgres.fields.JSONField`` and :lookup:`key lookups
- <hstorefield.key>` for :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.HStoreField`
- were subject to SQL injection, using a suitably crafted dictionary, with
- dictionary expansion, as the ``**kwargs`` passed to ``QuerySet.filter()``.
- CVE-2019-14235: Potential memory exhaustion in ``django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri()``
- =====================================================================================
- If passed certain inputs, :func:`django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri` could lead
- to significant memory usage due to excessive recursion when re-percent-encoding
- invalid UTF-8 octet sequences.
- ``uri_to_iri()`` now avoids recursion when re-percent-encoding invalid UTF-8
- octet sequences.
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