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- =====================================
- Cross Site Request Forgery protection
- =====================================
- .. module:: django.middleware.csrf
- :synopsis: Protects against Cross Site Request Forgeries
- The CSRF middleware and template tag provides easy-to-use protection against
- `Cross Site Request Forgeries`_. This type of attack occurs when a malicious
- website contains a link, a form button or some JavaScript that is intended to
- perform some action on your website, using the credentials of a logged-in user
- who visits the malicious site in their browser. A related type of attack,
- 'login CSRF', where an attacking site tricks a user's browser into logging into
- a site with someone else's credentials, is also covered.
- The first defense against CSRF attacks is to ensure that GET requests (and other
- 'safe' methods, as defined by :rfc:`7231#section-4.2.1`) are side effect free.
- Requests via 'unsafe' methods, such as POST, PUT, and DELETE, can then be
- protected by following the steps below.
- .. _Cross Site Request Forgeries: https://www.squarefree.com/securitytips/web-developers.html#CSRF
- .. _using-csrf:
- How to use it
- =============
- To take advantage of CSRF protection in your views, follow these steps:
- 1. The CSRF middleware is activated by default in the
- :setting:`MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES` setting. If you override that setting, remember
- that ``'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware'`` should come before any
- view middleware that assume that CSRF attacks have been dealt with.
- If you disabled it, which is not recommended, you can use
- :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_protect` on particular views
- you want to protect (see below).
- 2. In any template that uses a POST form, use the :ttag:`csrf_token` tag inside
- the ``<form>`` element if the form is for an internal URL, e.g.::
- <form action="" method="post">{% csrf_token %}
- This should not be done for POST forms that target external URLs, since
- that would cause the CSRF token to be leaked, leading to a vulnerability.
- 3. In the corresponding view functions, ensure that
- :class:`~django.template.RequestContext` is used to render the response so
- that ``{% csrf_token %}`` will work properly. If you're using the
- :func:`~django.shortcuts.render` function, generic views, or contrib apps,
- you are covered already since these all use ``RequestContext``.
- .. _csrf-ajax:
- AJAX
- ----
- While the above method can be used for AJAX POST requests, it has some
- inconveniences: you have to remember to pass the CSRF token in as POST data with
- every POST request. For this reason, there is an alternative method: on each
- XMLHttpRequest, set a custom ``X-CSRFToken`` header to the value of the CSRF
- token. This is often easier, because many JavaScript frameworks provide hooks
- that allow headers to be set on every request.
- As a first step, you must get the CSRF token itself. The recommended source for
- the token is the ``csrftoken`` cookie, which will be set if you've enabled CSRF
- protection for your views as outlined above.
- .. note::
- The CSRF token cookie is named ``csrftoken`` by default, but you can control
- the cookie name via the :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_NAME` setting.
- The CSRF header name is ``HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN`` by default, but you can
- customize it using the :setting:`CSRF_HEADER_NAME` setting.
- Acquiring the token is straightforward:
- .. code-block:: javascript
- // using jQuery
- function getCookie(name) {
- var cookieValue = null;
- if (document.cookie && document.cookie != '') {
- var cookies = document.cookie.split(';');
- for (var i = 0; i < cookies.length; i++) {
- var cookie = jQuery.trim(cookies[i]);
- // Does this cookie string begin with the name we want?
- if (cookie.substring(0, name.length + 1) == (name + '=')) {
- cookieValue = decodeURIComponent(cookie.substring(name.length + 1));
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- return cookieValue;
- }
- var csrftoken = getCookie('csrftoken');
- The above code could be simplified by using the `JavaScript Cookie library
- <https://github.com/js-cookie/js-cookie/>`_ to replace ``getCookie``:
- .. code-block:: javascript
- var csrftoken = Cookies.get('csrftoken');
- .. note::
- The CSRF token is also present in the DOM, but only if explicitly included
- using :ttag:`csrf_token` in a template. The cookie contains the canonical
- token; the ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will prefer the cookie to the token in
- the DOM. Regardless, you're guaranteed to have the cookie if the token is
- present in the DOM, so you should use the cookie!
- .. warning::
- If your view is not rendering a template containing the :ttag:`csrf_token`
- template tag, Django might not set the CSRF token cookie. This is common in
- cases where forms are dynamically added to the page. To address this case,
- Django provides a view decorator which forces setting of the cookie:
- :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.ensure_csrf_cookie`.
- Finally, you'll have to actually set the header on your AJAX request, while
- protecting the CSRF token from being sent to other domains using
- `settings.crossDomain <https://api.jquery.com/jQuery.ajax>`_ in jQuery 1.5.1 and
- newer:
- .. code-block:: javascript
- function csrfSafeMethod(method) {
- // these HTTP methods do not require CSRF protection
- return (/^(GET|HEAD|OPTIONS|TRACE)$/.test(method));
- }
- $.ajaxSetup({
- beforeSend: function(xhr, settings) {
- if (!csrfSafeMethod(settings.type) && !this.crossDomain) {
- xhr.setRequestHeader("X-CSRFToken", csrftoken);
- }
- }
- });
- If you're using AngularJS 1.1.3 and newer, it's sufficient to configure the
- ``$http`` provider with the cookie and header names:
- .. code-block:: javascript
- $httpProvider.defaults.xsrfCookieName = 'csrftoken';
- $httpProvider.defaults.xsrfHeaderName = 'X-CSRFToken';
- Other template engines
- ----------------------
- When using a different template engine than Django's built-in engine, you can
- set the token in your forms manually after making sure it's available in the
- template context.
- For example, in the Jinja2 template language, your form could contain the
- following:
- .. code-block:: html
- <div style="display:none">
- <input type="hidden" name="csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="{{ csrf_token }}">
- </div>
- You can use JavaScript similar to the :ref:`AJAX code <csrf-ajax>` above to get
- the value of the CSRF token.
- The decorator method
- --------------------
- .. module:: django.views.decorators.csrf
- Rather than adding ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` as a blanket protection, you can use
- the ``csrf_protect`` decorator, which has exactly the same functionality, on
- particular views that need the protection. It must be used **both** on views
- that insert the CSRF token in the output, and on those that accept the POST form
- data. (These are often the same view function, but not always).
- Use of the decorator by itself is **not recommended**, since if you forget to
- use it, you will have a security hole. The 'belt and braces' strategy of using
- both is fine, and will incur minimal overhead.
- .. function:: csrf_protect(view)
- Decorator that provides the protection of ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` to a view.
- Usage::
- from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_protect
- from django.shortcuts import render
- @csrf_protect
- def my_view(request):
- c = {}
- # ...
- return render(request, "a_template.html", c)
- If you are using class-based views, you can refer to
- :ref:`Decorating class-based views<decorating-class-based-views>`.
- Rejected requests
- =================
- By default, a '403 Forbidden' response is sent to the user if an incoming
- request fails the checks performed by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This should
- usually only be seen when there is a genuine Cross Site Request Forgery, or
- when, due to a programming error, the CSRF token has not been included with a
- POST form.
- The error page, however, is not very friendly, so you may want to provide your
- own view for handling this condition. To do this, simply set the
- :setting:`CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW` setting.
- .. _how-csrf-works:
- How it works
- ============
- The CSRF protection is based on the following things:
- 1. A CSRF cookie that is set to a random value (a session independent nonce, as
- it is called), which other sites will not have access to.
- This cookie is set by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. It is meant to be permanent,
- but since there is no way to set a cookie that never expires, it is sent with
- every response that has called ``django.middleware.csrf.get_token()``
- (the function used internally to retrieve the CSRF token).
- For security reasons, the value of the CSRF cookie is changed each time a
- user logs in.
- 2. A hidden form field with the name 'csrfmiddlewaretoken' present in all
- outgoing POST forms. The value of this field is the value of the CSRF
- cookie.
- This part is done by the template tag.
- 3. For all incoming requests that are not using HTTP GET, HEAD, OPTIONS or
- TRACE, a CSRF cookie must be present, and the 'csrfmiddlewaretoken' field
- must be present and correct. If it isn't, the user will get a 403 error.
- This check is done by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``.
- 4. In addition, for HTTPS requests, strict referer checking is done by
- ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This means that even if a subdomain can set or
- modify cookies on your domain, it can't force a user to post to your
- application since that request won't come from your own exact domain.
- This also addresses a man-in-the-middle attack that's possible under HTTPS
- when using a session independent nonce, due to the fact that HTTP
- ``Set-Cookie`` headers are (unfortunately) accepted by clients even when
- they are talking to a site under HTTPS. (Referer checking is not done for
- HTTP requests because the presence of the ``Referer`` header isn't reliable
- enough under HTTP.)
- If the :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN` setting is set, the referer is compared
- against it. This setting supports subdomains. For example,
- ``CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN = '.example.com'`` will allow POST requests from
- ``www.example.com`` and ``api.example.com``. If the setting is not set, then
- the referer must match the HTTP ``Host`` header.
- Expanding the accepted referers beyond the current host or cookie domain can
- be done with the :setting:`CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` setting.
- This ensures that only forms that have originated from trusted domains can be
- used to POST data back.
- It deliberately ignores GET requests (and other requests that are defined as
- 'safe' by :rfc:`7231`). These requests ought never to have any potentially
- dangerous side effects , and so a CSRF attack with a GET request ought to be
- harmless. :rfc:`7231` defines POST, PUT, and DELETE as 'unsafe', and all other
- methods are also assumed to be unsafe, for maximum protection.
- The CSRF protection cannot protect against man-in-the-middle attacks, so use
- :ref:`HTTPS <security-recommendation-ssl>` with
- :ref:`http-strict-transport-security`. It also assumes :ref:`validation of
- the HOST header <host-headers-virtual-hosting>` and that there aren't any
- :ref:`cross-site scripting vulnerabilities <cross-site-scripting>` on your site
- (because XSS vulnerabilities already let an attacker do anything a CSRF
- vulnerability allows and much worse).
- .. versionchanged:: 1.9
- Checking against the :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN` setting was added.
- Caching
- =======
- If the :ttag:`csrf_token` template tag is used by a template (or the
- ``get_token`` function is called some other way), ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will
- add a cookie and a ``Vary: Cookie`` header to the response. This means that the
- middleware will play well with the cache middleware if it is used as instructed
- (``UpdateCacheMiddleware`` goes before all other middleware).
- However, if you use cache decorators on individual views, the CSRF middleware
- will not yet have been able to set the Vary header or the CSRF cookie, and the
- response will be cached without either one. In this case, on any views that
- will require a CSRF token to be inserted you should use the
- :func:`django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_protect` decorator first::
- from django.views.decorators.cache import cache_page
- from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_protect
- @cache_page(60 * 15)
- @csrf_protect
- def my_view(request):
- ...
- If you are using class-based views, you can refer to :ref:`Decorating
- class-based views<decorating-class-based-views>`.
- Testing
- =======
- The ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will usually be a big hindrance to testing view
- functions, due to the need for the CSRF token which must be sent with every POST
- request. For this reason, Django's HTTP client for tests has been modified to
- set a flag on requests which relaxes the middleware and the ``csrf_protect``
- decorator so that they no longer rejects requests. In every other respect
- (e.g. sending cookies etc.), they behave the same.
- If, for some reason, you *want* the test client to perform CSRF
- checks, you can create an instance of the test client that enforces
- CSRF checks::
- >>> from django.test import Client
- >>> csrf_client = Client(enforce_csrf_checks=True)
- .. _csrf-limitations:
- Limitations
- ===========
- Subdomains within a site will be able to set cookies on the client for the whole
- domain. By setting the cookie and using a corresponding token, subdomains will
- be able to circumvent the CSRF protection. The only way to avoid this is to
- ensure that subdomains are controlled by trusted users (or, are at least unable
- to set cookies). Note that even without CSRF, there are other vulnerabilities,
- such as session fixation, that make giving subdomains to untrusted parties a bad
- idea, and these vulnerabilities cannot easily be fixed with current browsers.
- Edge cases
- ==========
- Certain views can have unusual requirements that mean they don't fit the normal
- pattern envisaged here. A number of utilities can be useful in these
- situations. The scenarios they might be needed in are described in the following
- section.
- Utilities
- ---------
- The examples below assume you are using function-based views. If you
- are working with class-based views, you can refer to :ref:`Decorating
- class-based views<decorating-class-based-views>`.
- .. function:: csrf_exempt(view)
- This decorator marks a view as being exempt from the protection ensured by
- the middleware. Example::
- from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt
- from django.http import HttpResponse
- @csrf_exempt
- def my_view(request):
- return HttpResponse('Hello world')
- .. function:: requires_csrf_token(view)
- Normally the :ttag:`csrf_token` template tag will not work if
- ``CsrfViewMiddleware.process_view`` or an equivalent like ``csrf_protect``
- has not run. The view decorator ``requires_csrf_token`` can be used to
- ensure the template tag does work. This decorator works similarly to
- ``csrf_protect``, but never rejects an incoming request.
- Example::
- from django.views.decorators.csrf import requires_csrf_token
- from django.shortcuts import render
- @requires_csrf_token
- def my_view(request):
- c = {}
- # ...
- return render(request, "a_template.html", c)
- .. function:: ensure_csrf_cookie(view)
- This decorator forces a view to send the CSRF cookie.
- Scenarios
- ---------
- CSRF protection should be disabled for just a few views
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Most views requires CSRF protection, but a few do not.
- Solution: rather than disabling the middleware and applying ``csrf_protect`` to
- all the views that need it, enable the middleware and use
- :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_exempt`.
- CsrfViewMiddleware.process_view not used
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- There are cases when ``CsrfViewMiddleware.process_view`` may not have run
- before your view is run - 404 and 500 handlers, for example - but you still
- need the CSRF token in a form.
- Solution: use :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.requires_csrf_token`
- Unprotected view needs the CSRF token
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- There may be some views that are unprotected and have been exempted by
- ``csrf_exempt``, but still need to include the CSRF token.
- Solution: use :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_exempt` followed by
- :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.requires_csrf_token`. (i.e. ``requires_csrf_token``
- should be the innermost decorator).
- View needs protection for one path
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- A view needs CSRF protection under one set of conditions only, and mustn't have
- it for the rest of the time.
- Solution: use :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_exempt` for the whole
- view function, and :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_protect` for the
- path within it that needs protection. Example::
- from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt, csrf_protect
- @csrf_exempt
- def my_view(request):
- @csrf_protect
- def protected_path(request):
- do_something()
- if some_condition():
- return protected_path(request)
- else:
- do_something_else()
- Page uses AJAX without any HTML form
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- A page makes a POST request via AJAX, and the page does not have an HTML form
- with a :ttag:`csrf_token` that would cause the required CSRF cookie to be sent.
- Solution: use :func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.ensure_csrf_cookie` on the
- view that sends the page.
- Contrib and reusable apps
- =========================
- Because it is possible for the developer to turn off the ``CsrfViewMiddleware``,
- all relevant views in contrib apps use the ``csrf_protect`` decorator to ensure
- the security of these applications against CSRF. It is recommended that the
- developers of other reusable apps that want the same guarantees also use the
- ``csrf_protect`` decorator on their views.
- Settings
- ========
- A number of settings can be used to control Django's CSRF behavior:
- * :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_AGE`
- * :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN`
- * :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_HTTPONLY`
- * :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_NAME`
- * :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_PATH`
- * :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE`
- * :setting:`CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW`
- * :setting:`CSRF_HEADER_NAME`
- * :setting:`CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS`
- Frequently Asked Questions
- ==========================
- Is posting an arbitrary CSRF token pair (cookie and POST data) a vulnerability?
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- No, this is by design. Without a man-in-the-middle attack, there is no way for
- an attacker to send a CSRF token cookie to a victim's browser, so a successful
- attack would need to obtain the victim's browser's cookie via XSS or similar,
- in which case an attacker usually doesn't need CSRF attacks.
- Some security audit tools flag this as a problem but as mentioned before, an
- attacker cannot steal a user's browser's CSRF cookie. "Stealing" or modifying
- *your own* token using Firebug, Chrome dev tools, etc. isn't a vulnerability.
- Is the fact that Django's CSRF protection isn't linked to a session a problem?
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- No, this is by design. Not linking CSRF protection to a session allows using
- the protection on sites such as a `pastebin` that allow submissions from
- anonymous users which don't have a session.
- Why not use a new token for each request?
- -----------------------------------------
- Generating a new token for each request is problematic from a UI perspective
- because it invalidates all previous forms. Most users would be very unhappy to
- find that opening a new tab on your site has invalidated the form they had
- just spent time filling out in another tab or that a form they accessed via
- the back button could not be filled out.
- Why might a user encounter a CSRF validation failure after logging in?
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
- For security reasons, CSRF tokens are rotated each time a user logs in. Any
- page with a form generated before a login will have an old, invalid CSRF token
- and need to be reloaded. This might happen if a user uses the back button after
- a login or if they log in in a different browser tab.
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