Fixed #30360 -- Added support for secret key rotation.

Thanks Florian Apolloner for the implementation idea.

Co-authored-by: Andreas Pelme <andreas@pelme.se>
Co-authored-by: Carlton Gibson <carlton.gibson@noumenal.es>
Co-authored-by: Vuyisile Ndlovu <terrameijar@gmail.com>

django/conf/__init__.py

@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ class Settings:
             "INSTALLED_APPS",
             "TEMPLATE_DIRS",
             "LOCALE_PATHS",
+            "SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS",
         )
         self._explicit_settings = set()
         for setting in dir(mod):

django/conf/global_settings.py

@@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ IGNORABLE_404_URLS = []
 # loudly.
 SECRET_KEY = ''
 
+# List of secret keys used to verify the validity of signatures. This allows
+# secret key rotation.
+SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS = []
+
 # Default file storage mechanism that holds media.
 DEFAULT_FILE_STORAGE = 'django.core.files.storage.FileSystemStorage'
 

django/contrib/auth/tokens.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ class PasswordResetTokenGenerator:
     key_salt = "django.contrib.auth.tokens.PasswordResetTokenGenerator"
     algorithm = None
     _secret = None
+    _secret_fallbacks = None
 
     def __init__(self):
         self.algorithm = self.algorithm or 'sha256'
@@ -25,12 +26,26 @@ class PasswordResetTokenGenerator:
 
     secret = property(_get_secret, _set_secret)
 
+    def _get_fallbacks(self):
+        if self._secret_fallbacks is None:
+            return settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS
+        return self._secret_fallbacks
+
+    def _set_fallbacks(self, fallbacks):
+        self._secret_fallbacks = fallbacks
+
+    secret_fallbacks = property(_get_fallbacks, _set_fallbacks)
+
     def make_token(self, user):
         """
         Return a token that can be used once to do a password reset
         for the given user.
         """
-        return self._make_token_with_timestamp(user, self._num_seconds(self._now()))
+        return self._make_token_with_timestamp(
+            user,
+            self._num_seconds(self._now()),
+            self.secret,
+        )
 
     def check_token(self, user, token):
         """
@@ -50,7 +65,13 @@ class PasswordResetTokenGenerator:
             return False
 
         # Check that the timestamp/uid has not been tampered with
-        if not constant_time_compare(self._make_token_with_timestamp(user, ts), token):
+        for secret in [self.secret, *self.secret_fallbacks]:
+            if constant_time_compare(
+                self._make_token_with_timestamp(user, ts, secret),
+                token,
+            ):
+                break
+        else:
             return False
 
         # Check the timestamp is within limit.
@@ -59,14 +80,14 @@ class PasswordResetTokenGenerator:
 
         return True
 
-    def _make_token_with_timestamp(self, user, timestamp):
+    def _make_token_with_timestamp(self, user, timestamp, secret):
         # timestamp is number of seconds since 2001-1-1. Converted to base 36,
         # this gives us a 6 digit string until about 2069.
         ts_b36 = int_to_base36(timestamp)
         hash_string = salted_hmac(
             self.key_salt,
             self._make_hash_value(user, timestamp),
-            secret=self.secret,
+            secret=secret,
             algorithm=self.algorithm,
         ).hexdigest()[::2]  # Limit to shorten the URL.
         return "%s-%s" % (ts_b36, hash_string)

django/core/checks/security/base.py

@@ -16,6 +16,15 @@ SECRET_KEY_INSECURE_PREFIX = 'django-insecure-'
 SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH = 50
 SECRET_KEY_MIN_UNIQUE_CHARACTERS = 5
 
+SECRET_KEY_WARNING_MSG = (
+    f"Your %s has less than {SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH} characters, less than "
+    f"{SECRET_KEY_MIN_UNIQUE_CHARACTERS} unique characters, or it's prefixed "
+    f"with '{SECRET_KEY_INSECURE_PREFIX}' indicating that it was generated "
+    f"automatically by Django. Please generate a long and random value, "
+    f"otherwise many of Django's security-critical features will be "
+    f"vulnerable to attack."
+)
+
 W001 = Warning(
     "You do not have 'django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware' "
     "in your MIDDLEWARE so the SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS, "
@@ -72,15 +81,7 @@ W008 = Warning(
 )
 
 W009 = Warning(
-    "Your SECRET_KEY has less than %(min_length)s characters, less than "
-    "%(min_unique_chars)s unique characters, or it's prefixed with "
-    "'%(insecure_prefix)s' indicating that it was generated automatically by "
-    "Django. Please generate a long and random SECRET_KEY, otherwise many of "
-    "Django's security-critical features will be vulnerable to attack." % {
-        'min_length': SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH,
-        'min_unique_chars': SECRET_KEY_MIN_UNIQUE_CHARACTERS,
-        'insecure_prefix': SECRET_KEY_INSECURE_PREFIX,
-    },
+    SECRET_KEY_WARNING_MSG % 'SECRET_KEY',
     id='security.W009',
 )
 
@@ -131,6 +132,8 @@ E024 = Error(
     id='security.E024',
 )
 
+W025 = Warning(SECRET_KEY_WARNING_MSG, id='security.W025')
+
 
 def _security_middleware():
     return 'django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware' in settings.MIDDLEWARE
@@ -196,6 +199,14 @@ def check_ssl_redirect(app_configs, **kwargs):
     return [] if passed_check else [W008]
 
 
+def _check_secret_key(secret_key):
+    return (
+        len(set(secret_key)) >= SECRET_KEY_MIN_UNIQUE_CHARACTERS and
+        len(secret_key) >= SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH and
+        not secret_key.startswith(SECRET_KEY_INSECURE_PREFIX)
+    )
+
+
 @register(Tags.security, deploy=True)
 def check_secret_key(app_configs, **kwargs):
     try:
@@ -203,14 +214,28 @@ def check_secret_key(app_configs, **kwargs):
     except (ImproperlyConfigured, AttributeError):
         passed_check = False
     else:
-        passed_check = (
-            len(set(secret_key)) >= SECRET_KEY_MIN_UNIQUE_CHARACTERS and
-            len(secret_key) >= SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH and
-            not secret_key.startswith(SECRET_KEY_INSECURE_PREFIX)
-        )
+        passed_check = _check_secret_key(secret_key)
     return [] if passed_check else [W009]
 
 
+@register(Tags.security, deploy=True)
+def check_secret_key_fallbacks(app_configs, **kwargs):
+    warnings = []
+    try:
+        fallbacks = settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS
+    except (ImproperlyConfigured, AttributeError):
+        warnings.append(
+            Warning(W025.msg % 'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS', id=W025.id)
+        )
+    else:
+        for index, key in enumerate(fallbacks):
+            if not _check_secret_key(key):
+                warnings.append(
+                    Warning(W025.msg % f'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[{index}]', id=W025.id)
+                )
+    return warnings
+
+
 @register(Tags.security, deploy=True)
 def check_debug(app_configs, **kwargs):
     passed_check = not settings.DEBUG

django/core/signing.py

@@ -97,10 +97,18 @@ def base64_hmac(salt, value, key, algorithm='sha1'):
     return b64_encode(salted_hmac(salt, value, key, algorithm=algorithm).digest()).decode()
 
 
+def _cookie_signer_key(key):
+    # SECRET_KEYS items may be str or bytes.
+    return b'django.http.cookies' + force_bytes(key)
+
+
 def get_cookie_signer(salt='django.core.signing.get_cookie_signer'):
     Signer = import_string(settings.SIGNING_BACKEND)
-    key = force_bytes(settings.SECRET_KEY)  # SECRET_KEY may be str or bytes.
-    return Signer(b'django.http.cookies' + key, salt=salt)
+    return Signer(
+        key=_cookie_signer_key(settings.SECRET_KEY),
+        fallback_keys=map(_cookie_signer_key, settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS),
+        salt=salt,
+    )
 
 
 class JSONSerializer:
@@ -135,18 +143,41 @@ def dumps(obj, key=None, salt='django.core.signing', serializer=JSONSerializer,
     return TimestampSigner(key, salt=salt).sign_object(obj, serializer=serializer, compress=compress)
 
 
-def loads(s, key=None, salt='django.core.signing', serializer=JSONSerializer, max_age=None):
+def loads(
+    s,
+    key=None,
+    salt='django.core.signing',
+    serializer=JSONSerializer,
+    max_age=None,
+    fallback_keys=None,
+):
     """
     Reverse of dumps(), raise BadSignature if signature fails.
 
     The serializer is expected to accept a bytestring.
     """
-    return TimestampSigner(key, salt=salt).unsign_object(s, serializer=serializer, max_age=max_age)
+    return TimestampSigner(key, salt=salt, fallback_keys=fallback_keys).unsign_object(
+        s,
+        serializer=serializer,
+        max_age=max_age,
+    )
 
 
 class Signer:
-    def __init__(self, key=None, sep=':', salt=None, algorithm=None):
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        key=None,
+        sep=':',
+        salt=None,
+        algorithm=None,
+        fallback_keys=None,
+    ):
         self.key = key or settings.SECRET_KEY
+        self.fallback_keys = (
+            fallback_keys
+            if fallback_keys is not None
+            else settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS
+        )
         self.sep = sep
         if _SEP_UNSAFE.match(self.sep):
             raise ValueError(
@@ -156,8 +187,9 @@ class Signer:
         self.salt = salt or '%s.%s' % (self.__class__.__module__, self.__class__.__name__)
         self.algorithm = algorithm or 'sha256'
 
-    def signature(self, value):
-        return base64_hmac(self.salt + 'signer', value, self.key, algorithm=self.algorithm)
+    def signature(self, value, key=None):
+        key = key or self.key
+        return base64_hmac(self.salt + 'signer', value, key, algorithm=self.algorithm)
 
     def sign(self, value):
         return '%s%s%s' % (value, self.sep, self.signature(value))
@@ -166,8 +198,9 @@ class Signer:
         if self.sep not in signed_value:
             raise BadSignature('No "%s" found in value' % self.sep)
         value, sig = signed_value.rsplit(self.sep, 1)
-        if constant_time_compare(sig, self.signature(value)):
-            return value
+        for key in [self.key, *self.fallback_keys]:
+            if constant_time_compare(sig, self.signature(value, key)):
+                return value
         raise BadSignature('Signature "%s" does not match' % sig)
 
     def sign_object(self, obj, serializer=JSONSerializer, compress=False):

docs/howto/deployment/checklist.txt

@@ -59,6 +59,22 @@ or from a file::
     with open('/etc/secret_key.txt') as f:
         SECRET_KEY = f.read().strip()
 
+If rotating secret keys, you may use :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`::
+
+    import os
+    SECRET_KEY = os.environ['CURRENT_SECRET_KEY']
+    SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS = [
+        os.environ['OLD_SECRET_KEY'],
+    ]
+
+Ensure that old secret keys are removed from ``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`` in a
+timely manner.
+
+.. versionchanged:: 4.1
+
+    The ``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`` setting was added to support rotating secret
+    keys.
+
 :setting:`DEBUG`
 ----------------
 

docs/ref/checks.txt

@@ -457,8 +457,8 @@ The following checks are run if you use the :option:`check --deploy` option:
 * **security.W009**: Your :setting:`SECRET_KEY` has less than 50 characters,
   less than 5 unique characters, or it's prefixed with ``'django-insecure-'``
   indicating that it was generated automatically by Django. Please generate a
-  long and random ``SECRET_KEY``, otherwise many of Django's security-critical
-  features will be vulnerable to attack.
+  long and random value, otherwise many of Django's security-critical features
+  will be vulnerable to attack.
 * **security.W010**: You have :mod:`django.contrib.sessions` in your
   :setting:`INSTALLED_APPS` but you have not set
   :setting:`SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE` to ``True``. Using a secure-only session
@@ -511,6 +511,12 @@ The following checks are run if you use the :option:`check --deploy` option:
   to an invalid value.
 * **security.E024**: You have set the
   :setting:`SECURE_CROSS_ORIGIN_OPENER_POLICY` setting to an invalid value.
+* **security.W025**: Your
+  :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[n] <SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS>` has less than 50
+  characters, less than 5 unique characters, or it's prefixed with
+  ``'django-insecure-'`` indicating that it was generated automatically by
+  Django. Please generate a long and random value, otherwise many of Django's
+  security-critical features will be vulnerable to attack.
 
 The following checks verify that your security-related settings are correctly
 configured:

docs/ref/settings.txt

@@ -2291,9 +2291,11 @@ The secret key is used for:
 * Any usage of :doc:`cryptographic signing </topics/signing>`, unless a
   different key is provided.
 
-If you rotate your secret key, all of the above will be invalidated.
-Secret keys are not used for passwords of users and key rotation will not
-affect them.
+When a secret key is no longer set as :setting:`SECRET_KEY` or contained within
+:setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS` all of the above will be invalidated. When
+rotating your secret key, you should move the old key to
+:setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS` temporarily. Secret keys are not used for
+passwords of users and key rotation will not affect them.
 
 .. note::
 
@@ -2301,6 +2303,36 @@ affect them.
     startproject <startproject>` creates a unique ``SECRET_KEY`` for
     convenience.
 
+.. setting:: SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS
+
+``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS``
+------------------------
+
+.. versionadded:: 4.1
+
+Default: ``[]``
+
+A list of fallback secret keys for a particular Django installation. These are
+used to allow rotation of the ``SECRET_KEY``.
+
+In order to rotate your secret keys, set a new ``SECRET_KEY`` and move the
+previous value to the beginning of ``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS``. Then remove the
+old values from the end of the ``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`` when you are ready to
+expire the sessions, password reset tokens, and so on, that make use of them.
+
+.. note::
+
+    Signing operations are computationally expensive. Having multiple old key
+    values in ``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`` adds additional overhead to all checks
+    that don't match an earlier key.
+
+    As such, fallback values should be removed after an appropriate period,
+    allowing for key rotation.
+
+Uses of the secret key values shouldn't assume that they are text or bytes.
+Every use should go through :func:`~django.utils.encoding.force_str` or
+:func:`~django.utils.encoding.force_bytes` to convert it to the desired type.
+
 .. setting:: SECURE_CONTENT_TYPE_NOSNIFF
 
 ``SECURE_CONTENT_TYPE_NOSNIFF``
@@ -3725,6 +3757,7 @@ Security
   * :setting:`CSRF_USE_SESSIONS`
 
 * :setting:`SECRET_KEY`
+* :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`
 * :setting:`X_FRAME_OPTIONS`
 
 Serialization

docs/releases/4.1.txt

@@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ Requests and Responses
 Security
 ~~~~~~~~
 
-* ...
+* The new :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS` setting allows providing a list of
+  values for secret key rotation.
 
 Serialization
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~

docs/topics/auth/default.txt

@@ -912,8 +912,9 @@ function.
 
     Since
     :meth:`~django.contrib.auth.models.AbstractBaseUser.get_session_auth_hash()`
-    is based on :setting:`SECRET_KEY`, updating your site to use a new secret
-    will invalidate all existing sessions.
+    is based on :setting:`SECRET_KEY`, secret key values must be
+    rotated to avoid invalidating existing sessions when updating your site to
+    use a new secret. See :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS` for details.
 
 .. _built-in-auth-views:
 

docs/topics/http/sessions.txt

@@ -123,13 +123,15 @@ and the :setting:`SECRET_KEY` setting.
 
 .. warning::
 
-    **If the SECRET_KEY is not kept secret and you are using the**
-    ``django.contrib.sessions.serializers.PickleSerializer``, **this can
-    lead to arbitrary remote code execution.**
+    **If the ``SECRET_KEY`` or ``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`` are not kept secret and
+    you are using the**
+    ``django.contrib.sessions.serializers.PickleSerializer``, **this can lead
+    to arbitrary remote code execution.**
 
-    An attacker in possession of the :setting:`SECRET_KEY` can not only
-    generate falsified session data, which your site will trust, but also
-    remotely execute arbitrary code, as the data is serialized using pickle.
+    An attacker in possession of the :setting:`SECRET_KEY` or
+    :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS` can not only generate falsified session
+    data, which your site will trust, but also remotely execute arbitrary code,
+    as the data is serialized using pickle.
 
     If you use cookie-based sessions, pay extra care that your secret key is
     always kept completely secret, for any system which might be remotely
@@ -323,11 +325,12 @@ cookie backend*.
 
 For example, here's an attack scenario if you use :mod:`pickle` to serialize
 session data. If you're using the :ref:`signed cookie session backend
-<cookie-session-backend>` and :setting:`SECRET_KEY` is known by an attacker
-(there isn't an inherent vulnerability in Django that would cause it to leak),
-the attacker could insert a string into their session which, when unpickled,
-executes arbitrary code on the server. The technique for doing so is simple and
-easily available on the internet. Although the cookie session storage signs the
+<cookie-session-backend>` and :setting:`SECRET_KEY` (or any key of
+:setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`) is known by an attacker (there isn't an
+inherent vulnerability in Django that would cause it to leak), the attacker
+could insert a string into their session which, when unpickled, executes
+arbitrary code on the server. The technique for doing so is simple and easily
+available on the internet. Although the cookie session storage signs the
 cookie-stored data to prevent tampering, a :setting:`SECRET_KEY` leak
 immediately escalates to a remote code execution vulnerability.
 
@@ -359,8 +362,8 @@ Bundled serializers
 .. class:: serializers.PickleSerializer
 
     Supports arbitrary Python objects, but, as described above, can lead to a
-    remote code execution vulnerability if :setting:`SECRET_KEY` becomes known
-    by an attacker.
+    remote code execution vulnerability if :setting:`SECRET_KEY` or any key of
+    :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS` becomes known by an attacker.
 
     .. deprecated:: 4.1
 

docs/topics/security.txt

@@ -296,7 +296,8 @@ security protection of the web server, operating system and other components.
 * Django does not throttle requests to authenticate users. To protect against
   brute-force attacks against the authentication system, you may consider
   deploying a Django plugin or web server module to throttle these requests.
-* Keep your :setting:`SECRET_KEY` a secret.
+* Keep your :setting:`SECRET_KEY`, and :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS` if in
+  use, secret.
 * It is a good idea to limit the accessibility of your caching system and
   database using a firewall.
 * Take a look at the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) `Top 10

docs/topics/signing.txt

@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ You may also find signing useful for the following:
   protected resource, for example a downloadable file that a user has
   paid for.
 
-Protecting the ``SECRET_KEY``
-=============================
+Protecting ``SECRET_KEY`` and ``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS``
+======================================================
 
 When you create a new Django project using :djadmin:`startproject`, the
 ``settings.py`` file is generated automatically and gets a random
@@ -34,6 +34,14 @@ When you create a new Django project using :djadmin:`startproject`, the
 data -- it is vital you keep this secure, or attackers could use it to
 generate their own signed values.
 
+:setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS` can be used to rotate secret keys. The
+values will not be used to sign data, but if specified, they will be used to
+validate signed data and must be kept secure.
+
+.. versionchanged:: 4.1
+
+    The ``SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`` setting was added.
+
 Using the low-level API
 =======================
 
@@ -93,13 +101,19 @@ generate signatures. You can use a different secret by passing it to the
     >>> value
     'My string:EkfQJafvGyiofrdGnuthdxImIJw'
 
-.. class:: Signer(key=None, sep=':', salt=None, algorithm=None)
+.. class:: Signer(key=None, sep=':', salt=None, algorithm=None, fallback_keys=None)
 
     Returns a signer which uses ``key`` to generate signatures and ``sep`` to
     separate values. ``sep`` cannot be in the :rfc:`URL safe base64 alphabet
     <4648#section-5>`. This alphabet contains alphanumeric characters, hyphens,
     and underscores. ``algorithm`` must be an algorithm supported by
-    :py:mod:`hashlib`, it defaults to ``'sha256'``.
+    :py:mod:`hashlib`, it defaults to ``'sha256'``. ``fallback_keys`` is a list
+    of additional values used to validate signed data, defaults to
+    :setting:`SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`.
+
+    .. versionchanged:: 4.1
+
+        The ``fallback_keys`` argument was added.
 
 Using the ``salt`` argument
 ---------------------------
@@ -221,7 +235,11 @@ and tuples) if you pass in a tuple, you will get a list from
     Returns URL-safe, signed base64 compressed JSON string. Serialized object
     is signed using :class:`~TimestampSigner`.
 
-.. function:: loads(string, key=None, salt='django.core.signing', serializer=JSONSerializer, max_age=None)
+.. function:: loads(string, key=None, salt='django.core.signing', serializer=JSONSerializer, max_age=None, fallback_keys=None)
 
     Reverse of ``dumps()``, raises ``BadSignature`` if signature fails.
     Checks ``max_age`` (in seconds) if given.
+
+    .. versionchanged:: 4.1
+
+        The ``fallback_keys`` argument was added.

tests/auth_tests/test_tokens.py

@@ -140,3 +140,39 @@ class TokenGeneratorTest(TestCase):
         msg = 'The SECRET_KEY setting must not be empty.'
         with self.assertRaisesMessage(ImproperlyConfigured, msg):
             default_token_generator.secret
+
+    def test_check_token_secret_fallbacks(self):
+        user = User.objects.create_user('tokentestuser', 'test2@example.com', 'testpw')
+        p1 = PasswordResetTokenGenerator()
+        p1.secret = 'secret'
+        tk = p1.make_token(user)
+        p2 = PasswordResetTokenGenerator()
+        p2.secret = 'newsecret'
+        p2.secret_fallbacks = ['secret']
+        self.assertIs(p1.check_token(user, tk), True)
+        self.assertIs(p2.check_token(user, tk), True)
+
+    @override_settings(
+        SECRET_KEY='secret',
+        SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=['oldsecret'],
+    )
+    def test_check_token_secret_key_fallbacks(self):
+        user = User.objects.create_user('tokentestuser', 'test2@example.com', 'testpw')
+        p1 = PasswordResetTokenGenerator()
+        p1.secret = 'oldsecret'
+        tk = p1.make_token(user)
+        p2 = PasswordResetTokenGenerator()
+        self.assertIs(p2.check_token(user, tk), True)
+
+    @override_settings(
+        SECRET_KEY='secret',
+        SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=['oldsecret'],
+    )
+    def test_check_token_secret_key_fallbacks_override(self):
+        user = User.objects.create_user('tokentestuser', 'test2@example.com', 'testpw')
+        p1 = PasswordResetTokenGenerator()
+        p1.secret = 'oldsecret'
+        tk = p1.make_token(user)
+        p2 = PasswordResetTokenGenerator()
+        p2.secret_fallbacks = []
+        self.assertIs(p2.check_token(user, tk), False)

tests/check_framework/test_security.py

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 from django.conf import settings
-from django.core.checks.messages import Error
+from django.core.checks.messages import Error, Warning
 from django.core.checks.security import base, csrf, sessions
 from django.core.management.utils import get_random_secret_key
 from django.test import SimpleTestCase
@@ -414,6 +414,79 @@ class CheckSecretKeyTest(SimpleTestCase):
         self.assertEqual(base.check_secret_key(None), [base.W009])
 
 
+class CheckSecretKeyFallbacksTest(SimpleTestCase):
+    @override_settings(SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=[('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx' * 2) + 'ab'])
+    def test_okay_secret_key_fallbacks(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            len(settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[0]),
+            base.SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH,
+        )
+        self.assertGreater(
+            len(set(settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[0])),
+            base.SECRET_KEY_MIN_UNIQUE_CHARACTERS,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(base.check_secret_key_fallbacks(None), [])
+
+    def test_no_secret_key_fallbacks(self):
+        with self.settings(SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=None):
+            del settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS
+            self.assertEqual(base.check_secret_key_fallbacks(None), [
+                Warning(base.W025.msg % 'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS', id=base.W025.id),
+            ])
+
+    @override_settings(SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=[
+        base.SECRET_KEY_INSECURE_PREFIX + get_random_secret_key()
+    ])
+    def test_insecure_secret_key_fallbacks(self):
+        self.assertEqual(base.check_secret_key_fallbacks(None), [
+            Warning(base.W025.msg % 'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[0]', id=base.W025.id),
+        ])
+
+    @override_settings(SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=[('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx' * 2) + 'a'])
+    def test_low_length_secret_key_fallbacks(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            len(settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[0]),
+            base.SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH - 1,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(base.check_secret_key_fallbacks(None), [
+            Warning(base.W025.msg % 'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[0]', id=base.W025.id),
+        ])
+
+    @override_settings(SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=['abcd' * 20])
+    def test_low_entropy_secret_key_fallbacks(self):
+        self.assertGreater(
+            len(settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[0]),
+            base.SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH,
+        )
+        self.assertLess(
+            len(set(settings.SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[0])),
+            base.SECRET_KEY_MIN_UNIQUE_CHARACTERS,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(base.check_secret_key_fallbacks(None), [
+            Warning(base.W025.msg % 'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[0]', id=base.W025.id),
+        ])
+
+    @override_settings(SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=[
+        ('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx' * 2) + 'ab',
+        'badkey',
+    ])
+    def test_multiple_keys(self):
+        self.assertEqual(base.check_secret_key_fallbacks(None), [
+            Warning(base.W025.msg % 'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[1]', id=base.W025.id),
+        ])
+
+    @override_settings(SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=[
+        ('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx' * 2) + 'ab',
+        'badkey1',
+        'badkey2',
+    ])
+    def test_multiple_bad_keys(self):
+        self.assertEqual(base.check_secret_key_fallbacks(None), [
+            Warning(base.W025.msg % 'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[1]', id=base.W025.id),
+            Warning(base.W025.msg % 'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS[2]', id=base.W025.id),
+        ])
+
+
 class CheckDebugTest(SimpleTestCase):
     @override_settings(DEBUG=True)
     def test_debug_true(self):

tests/settings_tests/tests.py

@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ class TestListSettings(SimpleTestCase):
         "INSTALLED_APPS",
         "TEMPLATE_DIRS",
         "LOCALE_PATHS",
+        "SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS",
     )
 
     def test_tuple_settings(self):

tests/signing/tests.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import datetime
 
 from django.core import signing
-from django.test import SimpleTestCase
+from django.test import SimpleTestCase, override_settings
 from django.test.utils import freeze_time
 from django.utils.crypto import InvalidAlgorithm
 
@@ -178,6 +178,39 @@ class TestSigner(SimpleTestCase):
             with self.assertRaisesMessage(ValueError, msg % sep):
                 signing.Signer(sep=sep)
 
+    def test_verify_with_non_default_key(self):
+        old_signer = signing.Signer('secret')
+        new_signer = signing.Signer('newsecret', fallback_keys=['othersecret', 'secret'])
+        signed = old_signer.sign('abc')
+        self.assertEqual(new_signer.unsign(signed), 'abc')
+
+    def test_sign_unsign_multiple_keys(self):
+        """The default key is a valid verification key."""
+        signer = signing.Signer('secret', fallback_keys=['oldsecret'])
+        signed = signer.sign('abc')
+        self.assertEqual(signer.unsign(signed), 'abc')
+
+    @override_settings(
+        SECRET_KEY='secret',
+        SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=['oldsecret'],
+    )
+    def test_sign_unsign_ignore_secret_key_fallbacks(self):
+        old_signer = signing.Signer('oldsecret')
+        signed = old_signer.sign('abc')
+        signer = signing.Signer(fallback_keys=[])
+        with self.assertRaises(signing.BadSignature):
+            signer.unsign(signed)
+
+    @override_settings(
+        SECRET_KEY='secret',
+        SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS=['oldsecret'],
+    )
+    def test_default_keys_verification(self):
+        old_signer = signing.Signer('oldsecret')
+        signed = old_signer.sign('abc')
+        signer = signing.Signer()
+        self.assertEqual(signer.unsign(signed), 'abc')
+
 
 class TestTimestampSigner(SimpleTestCase):
 

tests/view_tests/tests/test_debug.py

@@ -1459,6 +1459,7 @@ class ExceptionReporterFilterTests(ExceptionReportTestMixin, LoggingCaptureMixin
         """
         sensitive_settings = [
             'SECRET_KEY',
+            'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS',
             'PASSWORD',
             'API_KEY',
             'AUTH_TOKEN',
@@ -1475,6 +1476,7 @@ class ExceptionReporterFilterTests(ExceptionReportTestMixin, LoggingCaptureMixin
         """
         sensitive_settings = [
             'SECRET_KEY',
+            'SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS',
             'PASSWORD',
             'API_KEY',
             'AUTH_TOKEN',